## Gregory Flaxman (2000). *Introduction*. : University of Minnesota Press.
> [!INFO]
> Type:: [[chapter]]
> Title:: Introduction
> Author(s): [[Authors/Gregory Flaxman]]
> Year:: 2000
> Tags::
> DOI::
> Citekey:: flaxman_introduction_2000
> ZoteroURI:: [Open in Zotero: Introduction](zotero://select/items/@flaxman_introduction_2000)
> ReviewedDate:: [[2023-05-14]]
## Citation
```latex
[@flaxman_introduction_2000]
```
## Related
```dataview
TABLE file.aliases AS "Title" FROM [[@flaxman_introduction_2000]] and -"Plans" and -"resources"
```
## Summary
들뢰즈의 시네마 책들 [[@deleuze_cinema_1986]]와 [[@deleuze_cinema_1989]]를 기준으로 들뢰즈의 철학을 분석하는 책
## Annotation
들뢰즈의 시네마 책은 remarkable visibility로 향해간다.
> "The essence of a thing never appears at the outset, but in the middle, in the course of its development, when its strength this assured." (Page 1)
즉 그는 [[References/Concepts/movement-image]] [[time-image]]의 변화 속에서 그는 나타나는 힘을 발견한 것이다.
- The Movement-Image and The Time-Image were first published in1983 and 1985, respectively, with English translations appearingshortly thereafter, in 1986 and 1989. (Page 1)
- Moreover, the books themselves emerged within, or from, an intellectual climate that hadbegun to veer away from structuralist and psychoanalytic models (Page 1)
- hat still dominated [[discourse]] in England and the United States; (Page 2)
- Like Borges's great map of the world, Deleuze's cinematographic philosophy aspires to cover so much ground as to be a worldunto itself. (Page 2)
- InDifference and Repetition (1968) Deleuze announced that "[t]he searchfor a new means of philosophical expression ... must be pursuedtoday in relation to the renewal of certain other arts, such as thetheatre or the cinema." (Page 3)
- philosophyfor Deleuze is the process of constructing, creating, and inventingconcepts. (Page 3)
- which regulate thought according to this metaphysical program or "official genre" that Deleuze, like Nietzschebefore him, seeks to lay bare as a "system of judgment." (Page 4)
- cinema to mobilize the "powers of the false" so as to supersedthe representational categories that have been invented, procured,and ultimately naturalized for the purpose of judgment. (Page 4)
- for instance, painting invents blocks of lines and colors. (Page 4)
- hence its significance for Deleuze: philosophyengages cinematographic images because "time has always put the notion of truth into crisis." (Page 4)
- Deleuze situates the cinema in the long and vexed relationship between philosophy and time. (Page 4)
- Time was reduced to Cardo, the cardinal points or hinges on which it was seen to turn, but, as Deleuze argues, the appearance of [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s Critique of PureReason marked a tremendous philosophical reversal. Whereas space was previously the ground against which all change was gauged a ssuccession, [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] defines time as the a priori form of intuition: time is the "form of everything that changes or moves," (Page 4)
- encompasses succession (Page 4)
- "time ceases to be originary or derived, to become the pure form of interiority, which hollows us out, which splits us, at the price of a vertigo, an oscillation that constitutes time: the synthesis of time changes direction by constituting it as an insurmountable abstraction." (Page 4)
- all of which treat time as the movementin or the traversal of space. (Page 5)
- that Deleuze ascribes to a "sensory-motor schema,"a neural network that "affectively" contains the image-flux: (Page 5)
- recognizable, capable of being linked to otherimages (Page 5)
- a moral exigency, thepromise to make good, common sense. (Page 5)
- Ostensibly, wars, anonymous violence, even epic savagery would beredeemed later as part of the program, but how does one continueto believe when faced with the inconceivable twentieth century, ourmodern "theater of cruelty" (Artaud)? (Page 5)
- unity of space splinters into so manydisparate fragments. (Page 5)
- For Deleuze, a self-proclaimed philosopherof "patience," the indeterminacy of images induces a new cinematic"pedagogy." (Page 6)
- opening up a whole new sense of mental duration (duree) (Page 6)
- "subjective images, memories of childhood, sound and visual dreams or fantasies, where thecharacter does not act without seeing himself acting. (Page 6)
- Images are suffused by thought, and sothe cinema itself begins to suffer from self-consciousness, begins tocome into consciousness of its own production of cliches. (Page 6)
- By developing new images,the modern cinema thus establishes a new logic among images, thatis, a new kind of montage. (Page 6)
- the logic of thesensory-motor schema had relegated the image to an indirect presentation of time, a movement-image, this new logic ushers in thedirect presentation of time, a time-image. (Page 6)
- when it makes motion dependon time (with false moves manifesting temporal relations), the cinematic image becomes a time-image, (Page 6)
- For Deleuze, image and thought merge on what he calls the "[[plane of immanence]]," a transcendental, preindividual, and even prephilosophical field of infinite variation. (Page 7)
- The [[plane of immanence]] is a virtual plane, which is not to say thatit is "unreal" or "imaginary" or even something like a field of "possibility"; by "virtual," Deleuze means that the plane is composed ofincorporealities (events, singularities) that are not the "conditionsof possibility"25 but the genetic conditions in which possibilities arecreated. (Page 7)
- As Jean-Luc Nancy writes, "the word 'concept' means this for Deleuze-making cinematic."2 (Page 7)
- To reverse Nancy's formula, "the cinema means this for Deleuze--making concepts (Page 7)
- his books buck the current trend in film studies toward theoretical indifference (Page 7)
- instead, Deleuze writes of the cinema's signaletic material (matiere signaletique), its transition from movement-images to time-images, and its realization in postwar Europe. (Page 8)
- The past catches up with the future when the future lapses into dismal inertia. (Page 8)
- To this sick state of affairs Deleuze himself lent the phrase the "[c]ivilization of the image,"34 for the process of making images civilized, of reducing them to cliches, is tantamount to civilization-or, rather, civilization is tantamount to the labor of producing a "concerted organisation" of cliches and, thence, "misery." (Page 9)
- Is there still a reason left to esteem cinematographic images apart from those we see on television or in tabloids? Finally, is there really any use in theorizing the cinema at all? (Page 9)
- "However:, philosophical theory is itself a practice, just as much as its object."3 (Page 9)
- while cognitivists like David Bordwell and Noell Carroll denounce "grand theories," they continue to proceed on the basis of their own schematic, and universal, assumptions. (Page 9)
- The concepts that theory develops "must relate specifically to cinema," (Page 9)
- cinema itself is thereby made the mode for understanding the (Page 9)
- world, our world. Cinema inspires-in the very sense of breathing life, providing fresh air-philosophy (Page 10)
- Today it is said that systems are bankrupt," they write, "but it is only the concept of the system that has changed." (Page 10)
- of "poised systems"42 (Page 10)
- but systems that ride the delicate crest between chaos and order. (Page 10)
- the creation of an open system as it is itself a system (Page 10)
- essays in this collection tend to move beyond exegesis (Page 10)
- the power of cinema does lie in the capacity to exile us from familiar conceptual terrain (Page 10)
- system is tantamount to its own formation, (Page 10)
- Whence the three main sections that make up this collection (Page 10)
- "Approaching Images, (Page 10)
- "Mapping Images," (Page 10)
- but also how this transition suggests a new sense and system of history (Page 11)
- "Thinking Images," (Page 11)
- the domain of thought and life (Page 11)
- [[Ontology]], epistemology, and ethics (Page 11)
- cinema gravitate toward "thought from the outside" (Blanchot), a kind of thought that reaches beyond the chains of common sense. (Page 11)
- The world has become a bad film, Deleuze says (Page 11)
- "the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one's bearings in thought,"43 a kind of shifting "desert" on which concepts are the "intensive ordinates of movement, (Page 11)
- Referring to classical philosophy, Deleuze terms this image of thought "dogmatic." (Page 11)
- projects itself into the future as an anticipative matrix that turns any encounter into one of recognition. (Page 11)
- But how do we distinguish between the dogmatic image of thought and the images to which Deleuze devotes so much time in the cinema books and elsewhere? (Page 12)
- overarching image of thought that seals us off from chance and improvisation (Page 12)
- As such, the artistic image is neither a representation of an object nor even a visual impression, the first of which connotes mere recognition and the second a limited sensory bandwidth (Page 12)
- the image is a collection of sensations (Page 12)
- Deleuze will ultimately call a "sign (Page 12)
- In contrast to representation, which subsumes (re-presents) a particularity under a transcendental idea or category as common sense, thinking for Deleuze begins with a "disorder of the senses" (Rimbaud). (Page 12)
- the specific promise of this "disorder" he traces to [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s Critique of Judgment (Page 12)
- the third Critique (Page 12)
- suggests the possibility of deregulation (Page 13)
- Trying to comprehend these experiences, the imagination recoils, and out of this withdrawal there emerges a dehiscence between "what can be imagined and what can be thought, between imagination and reason." (Page 13)
- [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] compares this agitation to a "vibration" between faculties, and this is precisely what Deleuze means by sensation (Page 13)
- Sensation always initially betokens a kind of violence: insofar as the dogmatic image of thought solidifies itself in its own inertia (habits, rituals, conventions), sensation is like the setting off of a trip wire, the communication of a kind of synaptic frenzy through the faculties. (Page 13) ^61264a
- whereas [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] saw art as an instance of sensation and by no means the most important one, Deleuze is specifically invested in artistic sensation. (Page 13)
- Released from the prison of referentiality by sensation, thought turns to sensation to discover a model for its own construction of concepts. (Page 13)
- autopoetic (Page 13)
- and this is why philosophy engages art: like the production of sensation, which refers only to itself, (Page 13)
- The Movement-Image, "Camera-consciousness raises itself to a determination which is no longer formal or material, but genetic and differential." (Page 14)
- sensation reveals our "molar" existence as a dimension, formation, or perspective within a "molecular" universe (in Spinozan terms, the expressed within the process of expressing) (Page 14)
- Martin looks to van Gogh to suggest that sensations traverse the membrane separating Innenvelt and Umvelt, breaking it down until we are left with an in-between (Page 14)
- Bergson's thought "there is something that cannot be assimilated" by traditional philosophy (Page 14)
- As Deleuze explains it, "The movement-image is the object; the thing itself caught in movement as continuous function. The movement-image is the modulation of the object itself." (Page 15)
- movement-image, and so the conceptualization of its sensation begets, by definition, an investigation into the universe in its molecular aspect, that is, as an "aggregate" of such images (Page 15)
- just as the painter's eye was "in" the canvas, spread along its membranous textures (Page 15)
- which image = matter = movement = perception, Deleuze defines as the "[[[[plane of immanence]]]]," bearing in mind that (Page 15)
- But what of life? What distinguishes life, or, as Deleuze and Bergson say, the brain, from the universe? (Page 16)
- This difference in degree is not spatial so much as it is temporal or "interval," for life is simply a moment's delay or cut (ecart) introduced into the image-flux (Page 16)
- The question of prehension is borrowed from Whitehead and developed in concert with Leibniz, most notably in The Fold (1988), and it lies at the heart of this very different notion of thought (Page 16)
- in the sense that it is a filter that extracts itself from chaos. (Page 16)
- In The Movement-Image, however, this baroque architecture is transposed into a broader trajectory of human evolution and, by extension, cinematographic evolution, according to which we try to graft order on to chaos rather than sharing in its dynamism (Page 16)
- To begin with, the brain's extraction tends toward a kind of subtraction (Page 16)
- for Deleuze the definition of subjectivity, and its unfavorable connotation, derive principally from this subtraction. (Page 16)
- the delay allows the brain to "select their elements, to organise them, or to integrate them into a new movement." (Page 16)
- Bergson calls the "sensory-motor schema." In this schematism, in other words, images are recognized (as perception) and, in the interval (or affection), they are transformed (as action). (Page 17)
- when the cinema ceases to imitate normal human perception it discovers what Bergson already saw, "the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema (Page 17)
- modern philosophy, the question of putting movement into thought was effectively broached by Hegel, as Deleuze admits, but Hegel did so in a dialectical framework. (Page 17)
- refers to intelligible elements, Forms or ideas which are themselves eternal and immobile,"7 (Page 17)
- Like so many peaks of an EKG graph, these Forms consist in moments that transcend movement and that, in so doing, contrive to represent movement. (Page 17)
- pose, (Page 17)
- its synthetic privilege is such as to engage in posturing (posing) as movement. (Page 18)
- Movement, however, cannot be attained cardinally, according to the passing of chronological moments, because this reduces time itself to succession in space (Page 18)
- While the cinema takes photograms or frames at a regular speed of twenty-four per second, what it produces is not an illusion of movement or a simple succession of frames: what the cinema gives is "immediate movement." (Page 18)
- Now, in one sense Deleuze considers all art to be movement insofar as sensation moves thought; sensation is the vis e/astica that explains movement (Page 18)
- In other words, the cinema restricts its own potentialities, and in order to understand as much Deleuze recapitulates-and in the process reevaluates-the basic constituents of the cinema, from frame to shot to montage. (Page 19)
- by a mobile frame or montage, then, shots or movement-images express the qualitative change of sets, which Deleuze calls the "dividual" (by contrast, the time-image will concentrate on mobile frames and montage that exhaust actual space, providing an image of virtual becoming). (Page 19)
- y,the movement-image is an image of changing space or space covered, that is, an indirect image of time. (Page 19)
- "It's very difficult to think about, this relation between time, the whole, and openness," (Page 20)
- Each of Deleuze' s cinema books considers this "relation" from a different perspective (Page 20)
- movement-images relate only indirectly to the whole (Page 20)
- timeimages relate to the whole as an "outside" (Page 20)
- The cinema is likewise subjected to a centering, first with respect to technical conditions, and later with respect to narrative ones (Page 20)
- the cinema manages to center itself by imitating human perception, (Page 20)
- This dogmatic schema reduces images to a perceptual digestibility (Page 21)
- reducing them to an "even flow." (Page 21)
- The sensory-motor schema insinuates itself in the cinema as a pleasure principle (Lustprinzip), a kind of circuit breaker for controlling image-excitations (Page 21)
- even before Deleuze ever considered the cinema, he grasped the sensory-motor schema as a "story-telling function, (Page 21)
- how is it possible to talk of a (Page 21)
- subjectless cinema," of a preindividual cinema that leaves behind the conditions of the sensory-motor schema? And even if we manage to extinguish the varieties, doesn't this extinguishing of differentiation also imply an erasure of difference altogether? In order to even consider such crucial questions, it (Page 22)
- it is important to provide a sense of the cinema books as articulating two different means to deregulate or eliminate the subject. (Page 22)
- while The Movement-Image deals explicitly with this "planomenon," The TimeImage produces this plane on the body-brain itself, in ter (Page 22)
- whereas Deleuze's system of classification insists on precisely the ontological formula we have traced to this point-the identity of image, matter, movement, and perception. (Page 23)
- Bergson's own premise, namely, that mind and matter exist on the same plane and consist in the same material. (Page 23)
- this means that images consist of a signaletic material (matiere signaletique), "a plastic mass, an a-signifying and (Page 23)
- a-syntaxic material"96 from which signs are composed: the cinema provides a view on what Hjelmslev called "content"-not an utterance but the "utterable," a pre-signifying material. (Page 24)
- the cinema books affirm that essence to be the "adventure of movement and time."98 H (Page 24)
- Deleuze's classificatory system is inextricable from a broader sense of cinematographic "[[becoming]]. (Page 24)
- Deleuze condemns history as an enterprise that stakes out origins and anticipates conclusions, (Page 24)
- the result of which is a chronological series. (Page 24)
- a note of Hegelian inevitability: (Page 24)
- history reveals the prototypical movement of Spirit (Geist). (Page 24)
- when Deleuze is pressed to define his own sense of cinematographic history he recourses to a model of "natural history," (Page 24)
- the very kind of history that arises from classificatory systems or taxonomies. T (Page 24)
- The taxonomy Deleuze formulates is a means of classifying images or what we might simply call "light. (Page 25)
- the [[plane of immanence]] is a plane of light (Page 25)
- which the cinema gives rise are fluctuations of light (Page 25)
- his taxonomy embraces the much larger and more difficult question of the "visible." (Page 25)
- The notion of the visible (or "seeable") was developed by Foucault, whom Deleuze credits with having formulated a unique neo-Kantianism: in effect, (Page 25)
- Foucault t (Page 25)
- determination and receptivity (Page 25)
- the articulable (statements) and the visible (light) (Page 25)
- Above all, then, Foucault describes how the articulable determines the visible, and therein lies the key to this revised Kantianism (Page 25)
- Deleuze educes, Foucault's project consists in revealing truth as the determination of the seeable by the sayable (Page 25)
- ostensible configuration (Page 25)
- ironically, the "light of truth" emerges when light has been contained in any given apparatus (dispositif), when the power grid is so overwhelming as to render the resulting representation seemingly adequate. (Page 25)
- for Deleuze. First, the cinema offers a medium in which to grasp the fluctuating relationship of the articulable and visible (Page 25)
- What must be grasped, however, is that this emphasis itself corresponds to new power relations that have begun to leave those of "discipline" behind; the flourishing of our audiovisual culture, especially in the wake of the World War II, corresponds to the emergence of a new episteme. (Page 25)
- In all of this, one must keep in mind that these coordinates are elaborated with respect to the "soul of the cinema," a kind of ideal (or idealized) cinema in which Deleuze is interested for reasons that we are beginning to clarify. (Page 34)
- hereas the "greatest commercial successes" will always follow the "route" of the sensory-motor schema, and whereas blockbusters will always draw on the drive of actionimages (perhaps even more resolutely now that the possibility of old-style action, of acting in real life, increasingly seems implausible, or at best a kind of parody), the "soul" will always follow a different path. (Page 34)
- h (Page 34)
- inherited in part from Serge Daney, of a postmodern phase of cinematic "mannerism," such that the proliferation of images threatens to extinguish nature itself.1 (Page 34)
- reflex. For this reason, Deleuze insists in the cinema books that the brain, our thinking image, "has not even begun to think" (Heidegger) (Page 35)
- "spiritual automaton," (Page 35)
- these affections are directed, converted, and ultimately contained. (Page 35)
- We do not perceive the "thing in itself," Deleuze says (Page 35)
- we always perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs, and psychological (Page 35)
- demands." (Page 36)
- the "common sense" of the sensory-motor schema is underwritten (though unsigned) by a whole moral-normal regimen. (Page 36)
- Images we cannot recognize, events that elude our understanding, are quickly consigned to error, which in turn sustains the sovereign principle of regulated thought because error "pays homage to the 'truth.' ... " (Page 36)
## Source
Flaxman_2000_The brain is the screen copy.pdf
### Related
```dataview
LIST FROM [[@flaxman_introduction_2000]] and -"Plans" and -"resources"
```